通过关注最成功的合作伙伴来阻止叛逃者入侵
Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
摘要：
根据空间公共物品博弈的标准协议，合作者不仅投资于自己的博弈，而且投资于相邻合作者组织的博弈。在这项工作中，我们放宽了这一假设，允许合作者决定哪个相邻组，而不是支持他们一致。特别是，我们假设他们选择最成功的邻居，并将外部投资专门集中在相关群体中。我们表明，这种非常简单的改变的动态规则的结果在一个令人惊讶的积极的进化结果-合作者占上风，即使在恶劣的环境中所代表的小值的协同因素的游戏。合作者策略成功背后的微观机制可以用一种阻塞机制来解释，这种阻塞机制以一种有偏见的方式影响竞争策略的传播。我们的研究结果通过使用不同的交互拓扑结构保持不变，表明集中个人努力以达到更高的全球福祉可能是有益的。
英文摘要：
According to the standard protocol of spatial public goods game, a cooperator player invests not only into his own game but also into the games organized by neighboring partners. In this work, we relax this assumption by allowing cooperators to decide which neighboring group to prefer instead of supporting them uniformly. In particular, we assume that they select their most successful neighbor and focus external investments exclusively into the related group. We show that this very simple alteration of the dynamical rule results in a surprisingly positive evolutionary outcome -- cooperators prevail even in harsh environment represented by small values of the synergy factor in the game. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported success of the cooperator strategy can be explained by a blocking mechanism which affects the propagations of competing strategies in a biased way. Our results, which remain intact by using different interaction topologies, reveal that it could be beneficial to concentrate individual efforts to reach a higher global wellbeing.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
