通过操纵球员的可靠性来控制攻击力指标
Attacking Power Indices by Manipulating Player Reliability
摘要:
我们调查操纵的权力指数在TU合作游戏刺激(受预算约束)的变化,其他玩家参与游戏的倾向。我们展示了几种算法,表明问题往往是易于处理的所谓的网络中心性游戏和影响归因游戏,以及一个例子时,最佳操纵是棘手的,即使计算能力指数是可行的。
英文摘要:
We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the problem is often tractable for so-called network centrality games and influence attribution games, as well as an example when optimal manipulation is intractable, even though computing power indices is feasible.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。