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计算博弈对称性及尊重对称性的均衡

Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them

Carnegie Mellon University(卡内基梅隆大学);Strategy Robot, Inc.(策略机器人公司);Strategic Machine, Inc.(战略机器公司);Optimized Markets, Inc.(优化市场公司)

Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer

AI总结:

本文研究博弈中对称性的计算复杂性,发现其与图自同构紧密相关,并证明在一般和与团队博弈中求尊重对称性的纳什均衡分别为PPAD-和CLS-完全,同时给出特殊情形的多项式时间算法。

摘要:

战略互动可以通过识别多智能体系统中的对称性来更简洁地表示,并更高效地分析和求解。对称性还具有概念性意义,例如在均衡选择方面。我们研究了识别和使用对称性的计算复杂性。利用经典的正则形式博弈框架,我们考虑了可以跨越部分或全部玩家和/或动作的博弈对称性。我们发现博弈对称性与图自同构之间存在紧密联系,从而得到了刻画博弈中存在的对称性的图自同构和图同构完全性结果。另一方面,我们也证明了当以两种方式之一限制动作的考虑时,该问题变为多项式时间可解。接下来,我们研究了博弈对称性何时能被成功用于纳什均衡计算。我们证明了在一般和博弈和团队博弈中,找到尊重给定对称性集合的纳什均衡分别属于PPAD-和CLS-完全问题——即与布劳威尔不动点和梯度下降问题一样困难。最后,我们针对特殊情况提出了多项式时间方法,这些情况包括我们已知大量对称性,或者博弈为两人零和且我们甚至不知道对称性。

英文摘要:

Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium selection. We study the computational complexity of identifying and using symmetries. Using the classical framework of normal-form games, we consider game symmetries that can be across some or all players and/or actions. We find a strong connection between game symmetries and graph automorphisms, yielding graph automorphism and graph isomorphism completeness results for characterizing the symmetries present in a game. On the other hand, we also show that the problem becomes polynomial-time solvable when we restrict the consideration of actions in one of two ways. Next, we investigate when exactly game symmetries can be successfully leveraged for Nash equilibrium computation. We show that finding a Nash equilibrium that respects a given set of symmetries is PPAD- and CLS-complete in general-sum and team games respectively -- that is, exactly as hard as Brouwer fixed point and gradient descent problems. Finally, we present polynomial-time methods for the special cases where we are aware of a vast number of symmetries, or where the game is two-player zero-sum and we do not even know the symmetries.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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