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arXiv 2405.04696cs.GT
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线性空间竞争中近似均衡的近紧界

Nearly Tight Bounds on Approximate Equilibria in Spatial Competition on the Line

Umang Bhaskar, Soumyajit Pyne

AI总结:

本文研究 Hotelling 线性空间竞争模型的加性近似均衡,给出 3 名候选人及一般 $m$ 名候选人情形下可实现 $ε$ 的紧或渐近紧界。

摘要:

在 Hotelling 空间竞争模型中,单位质量的选民分布在区间 $[0,1]$ 上(其位置对应其政治倾向),$m$ 名候选人各自选择该区间内一个不同位置作为策略。每名选民投票给距离最近的候选人,候选人则选择策略以最大化所得选票。已知当候选人超过两名时,该模型中可能不存在均衡。然而,人们此前并不清楚能够达到何种接近均衡的程度。本文研究该模型中的近似均衡:若没有候选人能使自己的选票增加 $ε$,则一个策略组合就是一个(加性)$ε$-均衡;本文给出可实现近似参数 $ε$ 的紧或近紧界。我们证明,对于 3 名候选人,无论选民如何分布,都有 $ε\ge 1/12$。因此有些令人惊讶的是,对于任意选民分布和候选人的任意策略组合,总有至少占总选票 $1/12$ 的选票被“留在桌上”。在此基础上,我们证明在最坏情况下,存在某些选民分布使得 $ε\ge 1/6$,而且该界是紧的:总能计算出一个 $1/6$-近似均衡。随后,我们研究 $m$ 名候选人的一般情形,并证明随着 $m$ 增大,结果会更接近精确均衡:总能在多项式时间内得到一个 $1/(m+1)$-近似均衡。我们通过给出使 $ε\ge 1/(m+3)$ 的选民分布,证明该界在渐近意义下是紧的。

英文摘要:

In Hotelling's model of spatial competition, a unit mass of voters is distributed in the interval $[0,1]$ (with their location corresponding to their political persuasion), and each of $m$ candidates selects as a strategy his distinct position in this interval. Each voter votes for the nearest candidate, and candidates choose their strategy to maximize their votes. It is known that if there are more than two candidates, equilibria may not exist in this model. It was unknown, however, how close to an equilibrium one could get. Our work studies approximate equilibria in this model, where a strategy profile is an (additive) $ε$-equilibria if no candidate can increase their votes by $ε$, and provides tight or nearly-tight bounds on the approximation $ε$ achievable. We show that for 3 candidates, for any distribution of the voters, $ε\ge 1/12$. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, for any distribution of the voters and any strategy profile of the candidates, at least $1/12$th of the total votes is always left ``on the table.'' Extending this, we show that in the worst case, there exist voter distributions for which $ε\ge 1/6$, and this is tight: one can always compute a $1/6$-approximate equilibria. We then study the general case of $m$ candidates, and show that as $m$ grows large, we get closer to an exact equilibrium: one can always obtain an $1/(m+1)$-approximate equilibria in polynomial time. We show this bound is asymptotically tight, by giving voter distributions for which $ε\ge 1/(m+3)$.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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