arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1502.03945cs.GTcs.AIcs.CC
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单一产品供应商价格竞争的效率和复杂性

Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors

University of Patras(帕特雷大学);CTI “Diophantus”

Ioannis Caragiannis, Xenophon Chatzigeorgiou, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, George A. Krimpas, Nikos Protopapas, Alexandros A. Voudouris

摘要:

受人工智能文献中定价方面的最新进展的启发,我们研究了包含多个供应商的市场,这些供应商提供相同或相似的产品,而单位需求买家对这些供应商的估值不同。每个供应商的目标是将其产品的价格设定为一个固定值,以便其利润最大化。利润取决于供应商的价格本身以及认为特定价格比供应商竞争对手的价格更具吸引力的买家的总数量。我们将买卖双方的行为建模为两阶段完全信息博弈,研究了该博弈中均衡的存在性、效率(无政府代价)和计算复杂性等一系列问题。为了克服均衡不存在或存在但效率极低的情况,我们考虑这样一种情况,即一些供应商得到补贴,以保持低价格和买家高度满意。

英文摘要:

Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of each vendor is to set the price of its product to a fixed value so that its profit is maximized. The profit depends on the vendor's price itself and the total volume of buyers that find the particular price more attractive than the price of the vendor's competitors. We model the behaviour of buyers and vendors as a two-stage full-information game and study a series of questions related to the existence, efficiency (price of anarchy) and computational complexity of equilibria in this game. To overcome situations where equilibria do not exist or exist but are highly inefficient, we consider the scenario where some of the vendors are subsidized in order to keep prices low and buyers highly satisfied.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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