无线宽带业务中的频谱拍卖与竞争
Asymmetric-valued Spectrum Auction and Competition in Wireless Broadband Services
摘要：
我们研究两个恶意的移动网络运营商（MNOs）之间的投标和定价竞争，考虑他们现有的频谱持有。鉴于不对称值的频谱块拍卖给他们通过第一价格密封投标拍卖，我们调查两个恶意的移动网络运营商和用户之间的相互作用作为一个三阶段的动态博弈和动态博弈的均衡特征。我们展示了一个不对称的定价结构和两个恶意的移动网络运营商之间的不同的市场份额。也许与直觉相反，我们的研究结果表明，获得价值较低的频谱块的MNO总是降低其服务价格，尽管向用户提供双速LTE服务。我们还表明，谁获得高价值的频谱块的MNO，尽管charing更高的价格，仍然实现了更多的市场份额比其他MNO。我们进一步表明，两个MNO之间的竞争导致他们的收入损失。通过研究移动网络运营商利润转换的交叉点，它可以作为实际拍卖设计的基准。
英文摘要：
We study bidding and pricing competition between two spiteful mobile network operators (MNOs) with considering their existing spectrum holdings. Given asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them via a first-price sealed-bid auction, we investigate the interactions between two spiteful MNOs and users as a three-stage dynamic game and characterize the dynamic game's equilibria. We show an asymmetric pricing structure and different market share between two spiteful MNOs. Perhaps counter-intuitively, our results show that the MNO who acquires the less-valued spectrum block always lowers his service price despite providing double-speed LTE service to users. We also show that the MNO who acquires the high-valued spectrum block, despite charing a higher price, still achieves more market share than the other MNO. We further show that the competition between two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues. By investigating a cross-over point at which the MNOs' profits are switched, it serves as the benchmark of practical auction designs.
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