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arXiv 2610.21711cs.GTcs.LGcs.MAecon.GNq-fin.EC
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语言模型智能体如何重塑价格竞争

How language model agents reshape price competition

Technical University of Munich(慕尼黑工业大学)

Martin Bichler, Philip Hierhager, Kassian Köck, Fabian Pieroth

AI总结:

该研究针对重复伯川德竞争基准,发现LLM定价智能体的部署方式会影响价格竞争结果,不同部署模式可维持超竞争机制或动态高价锚点机制,推动定价竞争从静态均衡转向动态机制。

摘要:

重复伯川德竞争是算法定价的严格基准:在同质商品市场中,标准学习程序通常会选择价格接近边际成本的阶段博弈纳什均衡结果。我们表明,大型语言模型(LLM)定价智能体可根据部署决策摆脱这一基准。LLM通过更快的适应能力优于标准在线学习者,但这一优势在面对完全信息学习者时基本消失。提取的代理算法阐明了特定部署中的LLM如何通过定期削价 slower 学习者获利:每周期从包含竞争对手价格的原始市场历史中发布单一价格的智能体,在自我博弈中可维持超竞争机制;而定期从自身利润的汇总历史中发布概率分布的智能体,在自我博弈中会向竞争区域移动。混合这些接口的市场可产生动态机制,其中LLM建立高价锚点并定期削价以获取需求,这些机制可使两个竞争对手的价格均高于边际成本。部署选择决定这些结果,将重点从静态均衡转向动态定价机制。

英文摘要:

Repeated Bertrand competition is a stringent benchmark for algorithmic pricing: in homogeneous-goods markets, standard learning procedures typically select the stage-game Nash outcome with prices near marginal cost. We show that LLM pricing agents can escape this benchmark, depending on deployment decisions. LLMs outperform standard online learners through faster adaptation, but this advantage largely disappears against full-information learners. An extracted surrogate algorithm illustrates how LLMs in specific deployments profit from regularly undercutting slower learners. Agents that post one price every period from raw market histories that include rival prices can sustain supracompetitive regimes in self-play. Agents that periodically emit probability distributions from summarized histories of their own profits instead move toward the competitive region in self-play. Markets mixing these interfaces can generate dynamic regimes in which LLMs establish a high-price anchor and regularly undercut it to capture demand. These regimes can keep both competitors' prices above marginal cost. Deployment choices shape these outcomes, shifting the focus from stationary equilibria to dynamic pricing regimes.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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