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arXiv 2407.04088econ.GNcs.AIcs.GTq-fin.EC
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人工智能与双边市场中的算法性价格合谋

Artificial Intelligence and Algorithmic Price Collusion in Two-sided Markets

School of Mathematics, University of Minnesota(明尼苏达大学数学学院)

Cristian Chica, Yinglong Guo, Gilad Lerman

AI总结:

本文通过实验研究双边市场中基于 Q-learning 的 AI 智能体的默契合谋行为,发现网络外部性会加剧合谋,并提出在算法中加入惩罚项以抑制合谋、辅助监管。

摘要:

由人工智能(AI)算法促成的算法性价格合谋引发了重大关切。我们考察了使用 Q-learning 的 AI 智能体如何在双边市场中从事默契合谋。实验表明,与 Bertrand 竞争相比,AI 驱动的平台实现了更高的合谋水平。网络外部性的增强显著提升了合谋程度,表明 AI 算法会利用网络外部性来最大化利润。更高的用户异质性或更大的外部选项效用通常会降低合谋,而更高的贴现率则会增加合谋。即使在低贴现率下,默契合谋仍然可行。为了抑制合谋行为并为潜在的监管措施提供依据,我们提出在 Q-learning 算法中引入惩罚项。

英文摘要:

Algorithmic price collusion facilitated by artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms raises significant concerns. We examine how AI agents using Q-learning engage in tacit collusion in two-sided markets. Our experiments reveal that AI-driven platforms achieve higher collusion levels compared to Bertrand competition. Increased network externalities significantly enhance collusion, suggesting AI algorithms exploit them to maximize profits. Higher user heterogeneity or greater utility from outside options generally reduce collusion, while higher discount rates increase it. Tacit collusion remains feasible even at low discount rates. To mitigate collusive behavior and inform potential regulatory measures, we propose incorporating a penalty term in the Q-learning algorithm.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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