算法合谋的战利品:非对称企业间的利润分配
The Spoils of Algorithmic Collusion: Profit Allocation Among Asymmetric Firms
AI总结:
该研究通过重复古诺双寡头博弈实验发现,算法驱动决策下对称企业合谋倾向更低、非对称企业合谋倾向更高,等相对收益解最契合实验结果,打破了对称行业更易合谋的传统认知。
摘要:
我们研究了独立算法在重复古诺双寡头博弈中进行合谋的倾向。具体而言,我们探究了不同寡头垄断与议价解针对企业间非对称性影响的预测能力。我们发现消费者与企业均可从非对称性中获益。当企业对称时,算法会产生更具竞争性的结果;但当企业高度非对称时,竞争性结果会更少。尽管静态纳什均衡低估了对总产量的影响,高估了对利润的影响,但它在总福利方面的预测准确得惊人。对我们结果的最佳描述由等相对收益解(equal relative gains solution)提供。尤其值得注意的是,我们发现在所有非对称程度下,算法达成的利润都处于或接近帕累托前沿。我们的结果表明,当算法日益主导管理决策时,对称行业更易发生合谋这一普遍认知可能不再成立。
英文摘要:
We study the propensity of independent algorithms to collude in repeated Cournot duopoly games. Specifically, we investigate the predictive power of different oligopoly and bargaining solutions regarding the effect of asymmetry between firms. We find that both consumers and firms can benefit from asymmetry. Algorithms produce more competitive outcomes when firms are symmetric, but less when they are very asymmetric. Although the static Nash equilibrium underestimates the effect on total quantity and overestimates the effect on profits, it delivers surprisingly accurate predictions in terms of total welfare. The best description of our results is provided by the equal relative gains solution. In particular, we find algorithms to agree on profits that are on or close to the Pareto frontier for all degrees of asymmetry. Our results suggest that the common belief that symmetric industries are more prone to collusion may no longer hold when algorithms increasingly drive managerial decisions.
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