人工智能与自发合谋
Artificial Intelligence and Spontaneous Collusion
AI总结:
本文提出一个可处理模型研究学习算法间的策略互动,揭示算法合谋源于估计中的内生统计关联——自发耦合,并据此预测合谋出现的市场条件,为算法市场设计提供理论依据。
摘要:
我们开发了一个易于处理的模型,用于研究学习算法之间的策略互动。我们揭示了一种导致算法合谋出现的机制。我们观察到,算法会周期性地协调到比静态纳什均衡更有利可图的行动上。这种新颖的合谋渠道依赖于算法估计中一种内生的统计关联,我们称之为自发耦合。该模型的参数可以预测这种统计关联是否会出现,以及何种市场结构会促进算法合谋。我们表明,自发耦合能够维持价格和市场份额方面的合谋,补充了文献中的实验发现。最后,我们应用这些结果来设计算法市场。
英文摘要:
We develop a tractable model for studying strategic interactions between learning algorithms. We uncover a mechanism responsible for the emergence of algorithmic collusion. We observe that algorithms periodically coordinate on actions that are more profitable than static Nash equilibria. This novel collusive channel relies on an endogenous statistical linkage in the algorithms' estimates which we call spontaneous coupling. The model's parameters predict whether the statistical linkage will appear, and what market structures facilitate algorithmic collusion. We show that spontaneous coupling can sustain collusion in prices and market shares, complementing experimental findings in the literature. Finally, we apply our results to design algorithmic markets.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。