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arXiv 2202.07106cs.MAcs.AI
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学习减轻经济平台上的AI共谋

Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms

Harvard University(哈佛大学);John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences(约翰·A·保尔森工程与应用科学学院)

Gianluca Brero, Nicolas Lepore, Eric Mibuari, David C. Parkes

摘要:

在线电子商务平台上的协同定价引起了人们对默契合谋的担忧,其中强化学习算法学习以分散的方式设定合谋价格,只通过利润反馈。这就提出了一个问题,即是否可以通过设计适当的“购买箱”来防止串通定价,通过设计规则来管理电子商务网站向消费者推销特定产品和价格的元素。在本文中,我们证明了强化学习(RL)也可以被平台用来学习有效防止RL卖家合谋的购买盒规则。为此,我们采用了Stackelberg POMDPs的方法,并成功地学习了强大的规则,这些规则继续提供高消费者福利,同时卖家采用不同的行为模型或具有商品的分销成本。

英文摘要:

Algorithmic pricing on online e-commerce platforms raises the concern of tacit collusion, where reinforcement learning algorithms learn to set collusive prices in a decentralized manner and through nothing more than profit feedback. This raises the question as to whether collusive pricing can be prevented through the design of suitable "buy boxes," i.e., through the design of the rules that govern the elements of e-commerce sites that promote particular products and prices to consumers. In this paper, we demonstrate that reinforcement learning (RL) can also be used by platforms to learn buy box rules that are effective in preventing collusion by RL sellers. For this, we adopt the methodology of Stackelberg POMDPs, and demonstrate success in learning robust rules that continue to provide high consumer welfare together with sellers employing different behavior models or having out-of-distribution costs for goods.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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