无线服务市场中的竞争与监管
Competition and Regulation in Wireless Services Markets
AI总结：
本文通过演化博弈和非合作价格博弈模型，研究用户保留效用和频谱资源对无线服务市场竞争的影响，并分析监管机构通过调整这些参数实现不同目标的调控方法。
摘要：
我们考虑一个无线服务市场，其中一组运营商竞争大量共同用户。后者有一个保留效用U0单位，或者等价地，有一个满足其通信需求的替代选项。运营商必须满足这些最低要求才能吸引用户。我们将用户的决策和交互建模为演化博弈，将运营商之间的竞争建模为非合作价格博弈，并证明该博弈是一个势博弈。对于运营商选择的每组价格，演化博弈达到不同的稳定点。我们表明，两个博弈的结果取决于用户的保留效用和运营商可用的频谱量W。我们将市场福利和运营商的收入表示为这两个参数的函数。据此，我们考虑一个监管机构能够通过调整W和/或U0来干预和改变市场结果的场景。不同的监管机构可能有不同的目标和干预标准。我们分析了各种可能的监管方法，并讨论了它们的要求、影响以及对市场的影响。
英文摘要：
We consider a wireless services market where a set of operators compete for a large common pool of users. The latter have a reservation utility of U0 units or, equivalently, an alternative option to satisfy their communication needs. The operators must satisfy these minimum requirements in order to attract the users. We model the users decisions and interaction as an evolutionary game and the competition among the operators as a non cooperative price game which is proved to be a potential game. For each set of prices selected by the operators, the evolutionary game attains a different stationary point. We show that the outcome of both games depend on the reservation utility of the users and the amount of spectrum W the operators have at their disposal. We express the market welfare and the revenue of the operators as functions of these two parameters. Accordingly, we consider the scenario where a regulating agency is able to intervene and change the outcome of the market by tuning W and/or U0. Different regulators may have different objectives and criteria according to which they intervene. We analyze the various possible regulation methods and discuss their requirements, implications and impact on the market.
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