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arXiv 1610.00327cs.GT
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通过选择性价格披露提高比较购物代理商的竞争力

Improving Comparison Shopping Agents' Competence through Selective Price Disclosure

Chen Hajaj, Noam Hazon, David Sarne

摘要:

当今市场上过多的比较购物代理(CSA)使买家在购物时可以查询多个CSA,CSA之间的竞争自然出现。我们提出了一种新的方法,称为“选择性价格披露”,它提高了CSA的吸引力,通过删除输出列表中的一些价格。这种方法背后的基本思想是影响买方对获得更有吸引力的价格的机会的信念。本文提出了两种方法,这是适合于完全理性的买家,在CSA已知的价格中,决定哪些价格应该披露。使用从五个CSA收集的真实数据的方法的有效性和效率进行评估。该方法还与人类受试者进行了评估,表明选择性的价格披露在这种情况下也是非常有效的,但是,所披露的价格子集应该以不同的(简单化)方式提取。

英文摘要:

The plethora of comparison shopping agents (CSAs) in today's markets enables buyers to query more than a single CSA when shopping, and an inter-CSAs competition naturally arises. We suggest a new approach, termed "selective price disclosure", which improves the attractiveness of a CSA by removing some of the prices in the outputted list. The underlying idea behind this approach is to affect the buyer's beliefs regarding the chance of obtaining more attractive prices. The paper presents two methods, which are suitable for fully-rational buyers, for deciding which prices among those known to the CSA should be disclosed. The effectiveness and efficiency of the methods are evaluated using real data collected from five CSAs. The methods are also evaluated with human subjects, showing that selective price disclosure can be highly effective in this case as well, however, the disclosed subset of prices should be extracted in a different (simplistic) manner.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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