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arXiv 2203.01315cs.CR
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对权益证明GHOST/Ethereum的两次攻击

Two Attacks On Proof-of-Stake GHOST/Ethereum

Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse

摘要:

我们提出了两种针对权益证明(PoS)以太坊共识协议的攻击。第一次攻击表明PoS和PoS以太坊采用的贪婪最重观测子树(GHOST)分叉选择范式之间存在根本的概念不兼容性。简而言之,PoS允许一个拥有消失的股份的对手产生无限数量的模棱两可的区块。虽然大多数模棱两可的区块将被孤立,但这种孤立的“叔叔区块”仍然影响着GHOST范式下的分叉选择,赋予对手对规范链的毁灭性控制。虽然当前PoS以太坊的最新消息驱动(LMD)方面阻止了这种攻击的直接应用,但我们的第二次攻击显示了如何利用LMD来获得平衡攻击的新变体,该变体克服了最近旨在减轻平衡类型攻击的协议添加。因此,在目前的形式下,没有LMD和有LMD的PoS以太坊分别容易受到我们的第一次和第二次攻击。

英文摘要:

We present two attacks targeting the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Ethereum consensus protocol. The first attack suggests a fundamental conceptual incompatibility between PoS and the Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree (GHOST) fork choice paradigm employed by PoS Ethereum. In a nutshell, PoS allows an adversary with a vanishing amount of stake to produce an unlimited number of equivocating blocks. While most equivocating blocks will be orphaned, such orphaned `uncle blocks' still influence fork choice under the GHOST paradigm, bestowing upon the adversary devastating control over the canonical chain. While the Latest Message Driven (LMD) aspect of current PoS Ethereum prevents a straightforward application of this attack, our second attack shows how LMD specifically can be exploited to obtain a new variant of the balancing attack that overcomes a recent protocol addition that was intended to mitigate balancing-type attacks. Thus, in its current form, PoS Ethereum without and with LMD is vulnerable to our first and second attack, respectively.

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