BriDe Arbitrager:通过支持贿赂的延迟出块增强以太坊2.0中的套利
BriDe Arbitrager: Enhancing Arbitrage in Ethereum 2.0 via Bribery-enabled Delayed Block Production
AI总结:
针对以太坊2.0权益证明共识下的套利场景,提出BriDe Arbitrager工具,通过贿赂攻击延迟出块、结合自适应策略与延迟交易排序算法提升套利收益,实验验证日均利润可观且不触发罚没机制。
摘要:
以太坊2.0的到来带来了重大变革,尤其是向权益证明(Proof-of-Stake)共识的转变。这一变化为套利带来了新的机遇与挑战。在这些变革背景下,我们推出了BriDe Arbitrager,这是一款专为以太坊2.0设计的新型工具,利用贿赂驱动的攻击延迟出块,从而提升套利收益。其核心思路是允许恶意提议者通过贿赂验证者/提议者来延迟出块,进而获得更多时间识别套利机会。通过分析贿赂流程,我们设计了一种自适应贿赂策略。此外,我们提出了延迟交易排序算法(Delayed Transaction Ordering Algorithm),利用延迟时间放大恶意提议者的套利利润。为确保贿赂流程的公平性与自动化,我们设计并实现了贿赂智能合约与贿赂客户端。研究结果表明,BriDe Arbitrager可使控制有限(<1/4)投票权的攻击者通过贿赂延迟出块,并实现更高的套利收益。基于以太坊历史交易的大量实验结果显示,BriDe Arbitrager的日均利润达8.66 ETH(16442.23美元)。此外,我们的方法不会触发任何罚没机制(slashing mechanisms),即使在提议者-构建者分离(Proposer Builder Separation)及以太坊未来可能采用的其他潜在机制下依然有效。
英文摘要:
The advent of Ethereum 2.0 has introduced significant changes, particularly the shift to Proof-of-Stake consensus. This change presents new opportunities and challenges for arbitrage. Amidst these changes, we introduce BriDe Arbitrager, a novel tool designed for Ethereum 2.0 that leverages Bribery-driven attacks to Delay block production and increase arbitrage gains. The main idea is to allow malicious proposers to delay block production by bribing validators/proposers, thereby gaining more time to identify arbitrage opportunities. Through analysing the bribery process, we design an adaptive bribery strategy. Additionally, we propose a Delayed Transaction Ordering Algorithm to leverage the delayed time to amplify arbitrage profits for malicious proposers. To ensure fairness and automate the bribery process, we design and implement a bribery smart contract and a bribery client. As a result, BriDe Arbitrager enables adversaries controlling a limited (< 1/4) fraction of the voting powers to delay block production via bribery and arbitrage more profit. Extensive experimental results based on Ethereum historical transactions demonstrate that BriDe Arbitrager yields an average of 8.66 ETH (16,442.23 USD) daily profits. Furthermore, our approach does not trigger any slashing mechanisms and remains effective even under Proposer Builder Separation and other potential mechanisms will be adopted by Ethereum.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。