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arXiv 1807.09626cs.CR
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权益证明机制备忘录

A Memo on the Proof-of-Stake Mechanism

George Gui, Ali Hortacsu, Jose Tudon

摘要:

我们分析了以太坊Casper升级提案中讨论的权益证明机制产生的经济激励。与工作量证明相比,权益证明对于攻击者来说具有不同的成本结构。在Budish(2018)中,三个方程描述了比特币的极限,比特币具有工作量证明机制。我们调查他们的对手,并评估双重支出攻击和破坏攻击的风险。我们认为,PoS比PoW更安全,因为攻击者的可追踪性,这意味着攻击者有很大的“库存”成本。与采矿设备可重复使用的PoW系统相比,PoS也更安全,不会受到破坏攻击。

英文摘要:

We analyze the economic incentives generated by the proof-of-stake mechanism discussed in the Ethereum Casper upgrade proposal. Compared with proof-of-work, proof-of-stake has a different cost structure for attackers. In Budish (2018), three equations characterize the limits of Bitcoin, which has a proof-of-work mechanism. We investigate their counterparts and evaluate the risk of double-spending attack and sabotage attack. We argue that PoS is safer than PoW agaisnt double-spending attack because of the tractability of attackers, which implies a large "stock" cost for the attacker. Compared to a PoW system whose mining equipments are repurposable, PoS is also safer against a sabotage attack.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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