Proof-of-Work (PoW) is the most widely adopted incentive model in current blockchain systems, which unfortunately is energy inefficient. Proof-of-Stake (PoS) is then proposed to tackle the energy issue. The rich-get-richer concern of PoS has been heavily debated in the blockchain community. The debate is centered around the argument that whether rich miners possessing more stakes will obtain higher staking rewards and further increase their potential income in the future. In this paper, we define two types of fairness, i.e., expectational fairness and robust fairness, that are useful for answering this question. In particular, expectational fairness illustrates that the expected income of a miner is proportional to her initial investment, indicating that the expected return on investment is a constant. To better capture the uncertainty of mining outcomes, robust fairness is proposed to characterize whether the return on investment concentrates to a constant with high probability as time evolves. Our analysis shows that the classical PoW mechanism can always preserve both types of fairness as long as the mining game runs for a sufficiently long time. Furthermore, we observe that current PoS blockchains implement various incentive models and discuss three representatives, namely ML-PoS, SL-PoS and C-PoS. We find that (i) ML-PoS (e.g., Qtum and Blackcoin) preserves expectational fairness but may not achieve robust fairness, (ii) SL-PoS (e.g., NXT) does not protect any type of fairness, and (iii) C-PoS (e.g., Ethereum 2.0) outperforms ML-PoS in terms of robust fairness while still maintaining expectational fairness. Finally, massive experiments on real blockchain systems and extensive numerical simulations are performed to validate our analysis.
A blockchain faces two fundamental challenges. It must motivate users to maintain the system while preventing a minority of these users from colluding and gaining disproportionate control. Many popular public blockchains use monetary incentives to encourage users to behave appropriately. But these same incentive schemes create more problems than they solve. Mining rewards cause centralization in "proof of work" chains such as Bitcoin. Validator rewards and punishments invite attacks in "proof of stake" chains. This paper argues why these incentive schemes are detrimental to blockchain. It cons…
In the Zendoo whitepaper we introduced a novel SNARK-based construction that allows Bitcoin-like blockchains to create and communicate with sidechains of different types without knowing their internal structure. We also introduced a specific construction, called Latus, allowing creation of fully verifiable sidechains. In the paper we omitted a detailed description of an incentive scheme for Latus that is an essential element of a real decentralized system. This paper fills the gap by introducing details of the incentive scheme for the Latus sidechain. The represented ideas can also be adopted …
Existing permissionless blockchain solutions rely on peer-to-peer propagation mechanisms, where nodes in a network transfer transaction they received to their neighbors. Unfortunately, there is no explicit incentive for such transaction propagation. Therefore, existing propagation mechanisms will not be sustainable in a fully decentralized blockchain with rational nodes. In this work, we formally define the problem of incentivizing nodes for transaction propagation. We propose an incentive mechanism where each node involved in the propagation of a transaction receives a share of the transactio…
This work proposes a novel proof-of-work blockchain incentive scheme such that, barring exogenous motivations, following the protocol is guaranteed to be the optimal strategy for miners. Our blockchain takes the form of a directed acyclic graph, resulting in improvements with respect to throughput and speed. More importantly, for our blockchain to function, it is not expected that the miners conform to some presupposed protocol in the interest of the system's operability. Instead, our system works if miners act selfishly, trying to get the maximum possible rewards, with no consideration for th…
Blockchains have recently gained popularity thanks to their ability to record "digital truth". They are designed to keep persistence, security, and avoid attacks which is useful for many applications. However, they are still problematic in their energy consumption, governance, and scalability Current solutions either require vast computing power via Proof-of-Work (PoW) or cannot directly utilize computing power as a resource in virtual mining. Here, we propose incentive-based protocols that use competitions to integrate computing power into blockchains. We introduce Proof-of-Accumulated-Work (…
Incentive mechanisms are central to the functionality of permissionless blockchains: they incentivize participants to run and secure the underlying consensus protocol. Designing incentive-compatible incentive mechanisms is notoriously challenging, however. As a result, most public blockchains today use incentive mechanisms whose security properties are poorly understood and largely untested. In this work, we propose SquirRL, a framework for using deep reinforcement learning to analyze attacks on blockchain incentive mechanisms. We demonstrate SquirRL's power by first recovering known attacks: …
The current situation of COVID-19 demands novel solutions to boost healthcare services and economic growth. A full-fledged solution that can help the government and people retain their normal lifestyle and improve the economy is crucial. By bringing into the picture a unique incentive-based approach, the strain of government and the people can be greatly reduced. By providing incentives for actions such as voluntary testing, isolation, etc., the government can better plan strategies for fighting the situation while people in need can benefit from the incentive offered. This idea of combining s…
Smart grids leverage the data collected from smart meters to make important operational decisions. However, they are vulnerable to False Data Injection (FDI) attacks in which an attacker manipulates meter data to disrupt the grid operations. Existing works on FDI are based on a simple threat model in which a single grid operator has access to all the data, and only some meters can be compromised. Our goal is to secure smart grids against FDI under a realistic threat model. To this end, we present a threat model in which there are multiple operators, each with a partial view of the grid, and ea…
We discuss the issue of what we call {\em incentive mismatch}, a fundamental problem with public blockchains supported by economic incentives. This is an open problem, but one potential solution is to make application portable. Portability is desirable for applications on private blockchains. Then, we present examples of middleware designs that enable application portability and, in particular, support migration between blockchains.
Bitcoin-NG is among the first blockchain protocols to approach the \emph{near-optimal} throughput by decoupling blockchain operation into two planes: leader election and transaction serialization. Its decoupling idea has inspired a new generation of high-performance blockchain protocols. However, the existing incentive analysis of Bitcoin-NG has several limitations. First, the impact of network capacity is ignored. Second, an integrated incentive analysis that jointly considers both key blocks and microblocks is still missing. In this paper, we aim to address these two limitations. First, we p…
Financial fraud cases are on the rise even with the current technological advancements. Due to the lack of inter-organization synergy and because of privacy concerns, authentic financial transaction data is rarely available. On the other hand, data-driven technologies like machine learning need authentic data to perform precisely in real-world systems. This study proposes a blockchain and smart contract-based approach to achieve robust Machine Learning (ML) algorithm for e-commerce fraud detection by facilitating inter-organizational collaboration. The proposed method uses blockchain to secure…
Incentive Mechanism Design for Privacy-Preserving Decentralized Blockchain Relayers
Ibn Tofail University（伊本·图费勒大学）；University Mohammed VI Polytechnic（穆罕默德六世理工大学）；International University of Rabat（拉巴特国际大学）；University of Quebec at Trois-Rivieres（魁北克大学特罗-里维耶尔分校）；Learning and Game Theory Laboratory, TIMADIE（学习与博弈论实验室，TIMADIE）；University of Leeds（利兹大学）
To participate in the distributed consensus of permissionless blockchains, prospective nodes -- or miners -- provide proof of designated, costly resources. However, in contrast to the intended decentralization, current data on blockchain mining unveils increased concentration of these resources in a few major entities, typically mining pools. To study strategic considerations in this setting, we employ the concept of Oceanic Games, Milnor and Shapley (1978). Oceanic Games have been used to analyze decision making in corporate settings with small numbers of dominant players (shareholders) and l…
Skill verification is a central problem in workforce hiring. Companies and academia often face the difficulty of ascertaining the skills of an applicant since the certifications of the skills claimed by a candidate are generally not immediately verifiable and costly to test. Blockchains have been proposed in the literature for skill verification and tamper-proof information storage in a decentralized manner. However, most of these approaches deal with storing the certificates issued by traditional universities on the blockchain. Among the few techniques that consider the certification procedur…
RepChain: A Reputation-based Secure, Fast and High Incentive Blockchain System via Sharding
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology（香港科技大学）；Huazhong University of Science and Technology（华中科技大学）；Oasis Futrue (Shenzhen) Holdings（绿洲未来（深圳）控股有限公司）
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis（印第安纳大学-普渡大学印第安纳波利斯分校）；Bowling Green State University（鲍灵格林州立大学）；Shandong University（山东大学）
Blockchain-based federated learning (BCFL) has recently gained tremendous attention because of its advantages such as decentralization and privacy protection of raw data. However, there has been few research focusing on the allocation of resources for clients in BCFL. In the BCFL framework where the FL clients and the blockchain miners are the same devices, clients broadcast the trained model updates to the blockchain network and then perform mining to generate new blocks. Since each client has a limited amount of computing resources, the problem of allocating computing resources into training…
Federated learning may be subject to both global aggregation attacks and distributed poisoning attacks. Blockchain technology along with incentive and penalty mechanisms have been suggested to counter these. In this paper, we explore verifiable off-chain computations using zero-knowledge proofs as an alternative to incentive and penalty mechanisms in blockchain-based federated learning. In our solution, learning nodes, in addition to their computational duties, act as off-chain provers submitting proofs to attest computational correctness of parameters that can be verified on the blockchain. W…
A large number of IoT devices are connected via the Internet. However, most of these IoT devices are generally not perfect-by-design even have security weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Thus, it is essential to update these IoT devices securely, patching their vulnerabilities and protecting the safety of the involved users. Existing studies deliver secure and reliable updates based on blockchain network which serves as the transmission network. However, these approaches could compromise users privacy when updating the IoT devices. In this paper, we propose a new blockchain based privacy-preservin…
We study the strategic implications that arise from adding one extra option to the miners participating in the bitcoin protocol. We propose that when adding a block, miners also have the ability to pay forward an amount to be collected by the first miner who successfully extends their branch, giving them the power to influence the incentives for mining. We formulate a stochastic game for the study of such incentives and show that with this added option, smaller miners can guarantee that the best response of even substantially more powerful miners is to follow the expected behavior intended by …
We present an overview of hybrid Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget (FFG): a Proof-of-Stake checkpointing protocol overlaid onto Ethereum's Proof-of-Work blockchain. We describe its core functionalities and reward scheme, and explore its properties. Our findings indicate that Casper's implemented incentives mechanism ensures liveness, while providing safety guarantees that improve over standard Proof-of-Work protocols. Based on a minimal-impact implementation of the protocol as a smart contract on the blockchain, we discuss additional issues related to parametrisation, funding, throughput and…
Services computing can offer a high-level abstraction to support diverse applications via encapsulating various computing infrastructures. Though services computing has greatly boosted the productivity of developers, it is faced with three main challenges: privacy and security risks, information silo, and pricing mechanisms and incentives. The recent advances of blockchain bring opportunities to address the challenges of services computing due to its build-in encryption as well as digital signature schemes, decentralization feature, and intrinsic incentive mechanisms. In this paper, we present…
Bitcoin-NG, a scalable blockchain protocol, divides each block into a key block and many micro blocks to effectively improve the transaction processing capacity. Bitcoin-NG has a special incentive mechanism (i.e. splitting transaction fees to the current and the next leader) to maintain its security. However, this design of the incentive mechanism ignores the joint effect of transaction fees, mint coins and mining duration lengths on the expected mining reward. In this paper, we identify the advanced mining attack that deliberately ignores micro blocks to enlarge the mining duration length to …
Blockchain offers traceability and transparency to supply chain event data and hence can help overcome many challenges in supply chain management such as: data integrity, provenance and traceability. However, data privacy concerns such as the protection of trade secrets have hindered adoption of blockchain technology. Although consortium blockchains only allow authorised supply chain entities to read/write to the ledger, privacy preservation of trade secrets cannot be ascertained. In this work, we propose a privacy-preservation framework, PrivChain, to protect sensitive data on blockchain usin…
D2M: A Decentralized, Privacy-Preserving, Incentive-Compatible Data Marketplace for Collaborative Learning
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Jodhpur（计算机科学与工程系，印度理工学院，乔浦尔）；School of Mathematics and Computational Sciences, Eastern University Pennsylvania（数学与计算科学学院，东部大学宾夕法尼亚）
A new variation of blockchain proof of work algorithm is proposed to incentivize the timely execution of image processing algorithms. A sample image processing algorithm is proposed to determine interesting images using analysis of the entropy of pixel subsets within images. The efficacy of the image processing algorithm is examined using two small sets of training and test data. The interesting image algorithm is then integrated into a simplified blockchain mining proof of work algorithm based on Bitcoin. The incentive of cryptocurrency mining is theorized to incentivize the execution of the …
Analyzing Reward Dynamics and Decentralization in Ethereum 2.0: An Advanced Data Engineering Workflow and Comprehensive Datasets for Proof-of-Stake Incentives
The dominance of a few big companies in the storage market arising various concerns including single point of failure, privacy violation, and oligopoly. To eliminate the dependency on such a centralized storage architecture, several Decentralized Storage Network (DSN) schemes such as Filecoin, Sia, and Storj have been introduced. DSNs leverage blockchain technology to create a storage platform such that the micro storage providers can also participate in the storage market. To verify the accurate data storage by the storage providers during a storage contract, DSNs apply a Proof of Storage (Po…
While Proof-of-Work (PoW) is the most widely used consensus mechanism for blockchain, it received harsh criticism due to its massive waste of energy for meaningless hash calculation. Some studies have introduced Proof-of-Stake to address this issue. However, such protocols widen the gap between rich and poor and in the worst case lead to an oligopoly, where the rich control the entire network. Other studies have attempted to translate the energy consumption of PoW into useful work, but they have many limitations, such as narrow application scope, serious security issues and impractical incenti…
Blockchain is a technology that provides a distributed ledger that stores previous records while maintaining consistency and security. Bitcoin is the first and largest decentralized electronic cryptographic system that uses blockchain technology. It faces a challenge in making all the nodes synchronize and have the same overall view with the cost of scalability and performance. In addition, with miners' financial interest playing a significant role in choosing transactions from the backlog, small fee or small fee per byte value transactions will exhibit more delays. To study the issues related…
National University of Singapore（新加坡国立大学）；Tsinghua University（清华大学）；Shanghai Qi Zhi Institute（上海期智研究院）；HKUST (GZ)（香港科技大学（广州））；New York University（纽约大学）；Yau Mathematical Sciences Center（丘成桐数学科学中心）
Smart contract-enabled blockchains allow building decentralized applications in which mutually-distrusted parties can work together. Recently, oracle services emerged to provide these applications with real-world data feeds. Unfortunately, these capabilities have been used for malicious purposes under what is called criminal smart contracts. A few works explored this dark side and showed a variety of such attacks. However, none of them considered collaborative attacks against targets that reside outside the blockchain ecosystem. In this paper, we bridge this gap and introduce a smart contract-…
