arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2102.02247cs.CR
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1/3以下利益相关者对以太坊2.0的低成本攻击

Low-cost attacks on Ethereum 2.0 by sub-1/3 stakeholders

Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes

摘要:

我们概述了两种可以在以太坊2.0信标链上廉价执行的不诚实策略,即使验证者持有不到总股份的三分之一:恶意链重组(“重组”)和最终延迟。在恶意重组中,攻击者在适当的时候释放他们的区块和证明之前扣留他们的区块和证明,以强制进行链重组,他们可以通过双重支出或提前交易来利用这些重组。为了执行终结性延迟,攻击者使用延迟的块释放和扣留证明来增加块完成所需时间的均值和方差。这影响了系统的效率和可预测性。我们为这些攻击中的每一个提供了概率和成本分析,考虑到验证者拥有30%的总股份。

英文摘要:

We outline two dishonest strategies that can be cheaply executed on the Ethereum 2.0 beacon chain, even by validators holding less than one-third of the total stake: malicious chain reorganizations ("reorgs") and finality delays. In a malicious reorg, an attacker withholds their blocks and attestations before releasing them at an opportune time in order to force a chain reorganization, which they can take advantage of by double-spending or front-running transactions. To execute a finality delay an attacker uses delayed block releases and withholding of attestations to increase the mean and variance of the time it takes blocks to become finalized. This impacts the efficiency and predictability of the system. We provide a probabilistic and cost analysis for each of these attacks, considering a validator with 30% of the total stake.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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