政治权力与市场势力
Political Power and Market Power
AI总结：
该研究构建政治影响力与市场竞争的联合模型，结合美国1999-2017年数据，证实并购会提升企业及行业协会的游说水平，还与内部游说团队、企业PAC成立及更高竞选献金相关，揭示了政治权力与市场势力的关联。
摘要：
我们研究政治影响力与产业集中度之间的关联。我们提出了一个政治影响力与市场竞争的联合模型：寡头垄断企业就监管问题向政府游说，并在受这种影响力塑造的产品市场中竞争。我们给出了企业并购在集约边际和广延边际上均会提升游说水平的宽泛条件。我们结合了1999年至2017年美国的并购数据与游说支出、竞选献金数据。我们证实，无论是单个企业还是行业贸易协会，并购与游说活动之间均存在正相关关系。并购还与广延边际的变化相关，例如内部游说团队和企业政治行动委员会（PAC）的成立。我们还发现了部分证据，表明并购与更高的竞选献金之间存在正相关关系。
英文摘要：
We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. We present a joint model of political influence and market competition: an oligopoly lobbies the government over regulation, and competes in the product market shaped by this influence. We show broad conditions for mergers to increase lobbying, both on the intensive margin and the extensive margin. We combine data on mergers with data on lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions in the US from 1999 to 2017. We document a positive association between mergers and lobbying, both by individual firms and by industry trade associations. Mergers are also associated with extensive margin changes such as the formation of in-house lobbying teams and corporate PACs. We find some evidence for a positive association between mergers and higher campaign contributions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
