政治权力对公共教育供给的因果效应：来自加权投票系统的证据
The causal effect of political power on the provision of public education: Evidence from a weighted voting system
摘要：
在本文中，我们估计的因果关系的影响，政治权力的公共教育的提供。我们使用的数据来自一个历史上的非民主社会，该社会采用加权投票制度，合格选民获得的选票与他们的应纳税收入成比例，并且对最高票数没有任何限制，即，1862-1909年瑞典地方政府的政治制度。我们使用一种新的识别策略，其中我们结合了两种不同的识别策略，即，一个阈值回归分析和一个广义的事件研究设计，两者都利用了两个对立的地方精英：农业地主和新兴工业家之间的政治权力的影响的非线性或不连续性。结果表明，如果非农业利益控制所有选票，与土地所有者拥有超过多数选票相比，学校支出大约高出90-120%。此外，我们没有发现任何证据表明土地所有权的集中影响了这种关系
英文摘要：
In this paper, we estimate the causal effect of political power on the provision of public education. We use data from a historical nondemocratic society with a weighted voting system where eligible voters received votes in proportion to their taxable income and without any limit on the maximum of votes, i.e., the political system used in Swedish local governments during the period 1862-1909. We use a novel identification strategy where we combine two different identification strategies, i.e., a threshold regression analysis and a generalized event-study design, both of which exploit nonlinearities or discontinuities in the effect of political power between two opposing local elites: agricultural landowners and emerging industrialists. The results suggest that school spending is approximately 90-120% higher if the nonagrarian interest controls all of the votes compared to when landowners have more than a majority of votes. Moreover, we find no evidence that the concentration of landownership affected this relationship
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