政治权力分享、企业进入与经济增长：来自多名当选代表的证据
Political Power-Sharing, Firm Entry, and Economic Growth: Evidence from Multiple Elected Representatives
AI总结：
该研究利用地理断点设计与选区重划的准自然实验，发现立场不一致的多名政客通过制衡提升效率，可促进企业创建、降低失业、推动地方经济增长。
AI中文摘要：
我们研究政治权力分享对地方经济活动的影响。该影响取决于不受约束的权力相关风险，以及制衡带来的潜在效率增益或损失的相对重要性。我们的研究设计利用了选举边界与行政边界偶然重叠产生的地理断点设计，该设计生成了相邻地区治理政客数量的准随机变化。我们还结合了选区重划事件，借此利用地区内部政客数量的变化。我们发现，增加某一地区的治理政客数量能够促进新企业创建、降低失业率，并提升实际经济活动水平。我们的结果表明，立场不一致的多名政客通过相互制衡提升了国家效率，减少了监管障碍、裙带关系，并改善了公共基础设施供给，为企业创建创造了有利的经济环境。
英文摘要：
We examine the effect of political power-sharing on local economic activity. This effect depends on the relative importance of the risks associated with unchecked power and the potential efficiency gains or losses arising from checks and balances. Our research design exploits a geographic discontinuity design due to the haphazard overlap of electoral and administrative boundaries that generates quasi-random variation in the number of politicians governing adjacent regions. We supplement this design using an episode of electoral delimitation that allows us to exploit within-region variation in the number of politicians. We find increasing the number of politicians governing an area can lead to new firm creation, lower unemployment, and greater real economic activity. Our results suggest that non-aligned multiple politicians enhance state efficiency by imposing checks and balances on each other, leading to lower regulatory obstacles, less cronyism, and improved provision of public infrastructure, creating an economically favorable environment for firm creation.
