单一可转移投票制与负向及正向参与悖论
Single Transferable Vote and Paradoxes of Negative and Positive Involvement
AI总结：
本文研究单一可转移投票制（STV）中的参与悖论，即更多不支持者或支持者参与反而改变胜负结果，并通过最坏情况分析和苏格兰选举实例加以说明。
摘要：
我们分析了一类投票悖论，称之为参与悖论：某位候选人在选举中落败，但如果更多不支持该候选人的选民参与投票，该候选人反而可能获胜；或者某位候选人原本获胜，但如果更多支持该候选人的选民参与投票，该候选人反而可能落败。在单一可转移投票制（STV）下，这类悖论性结果可能出现，而STV在世界各地的政治选举中被广泛使用。我们对STV下的参与悖论进行了最坏情况分析，并展示了苏格兰选举中若干有趣的此类悖论实例。
英文摘要：
We analyze a type of voting paradox which we term an involvement paradox, in which a candidate who loses an election could be made into a winner if more of the candidate's non-supporters participated in the election, or a winner could be made into a loser if more of the candidate's supporters participated. Such paradoxical outcomes are possible under the voting method of single transferable vote (STV), which is widely used for political elections throughout the world. We provide a worst-case analysis of involvement paradoxes under STV and show several interesting examples of these paradoxes from elections in Scotland.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
