竞争、政治和社交媒体
Competition, Politics, & Social Media
摘要：
越来越多的政治家依靠更便宜、更容易获得的技术，如在线社交媒体平台，与他们的选民沟通。这些平台为政治家提供了一个廉价和低障碍的沟通渠道，通过允许许多人参加政治竞选，可能会加剧政治竞争。在这项研究中，我们证明，降低通信成本，这使得许多进入竞争激烈的市场，可以加强现任者的地位时，新来者的竞争，提供更多的信息给选民。我们展示了一个不对称的坏消息-好消息效应，早期的负面消息伤害了挑战者，而不是积极的消息使他们受益，因此，总的来说，现任政治家获胜的机会更高，市场上有更多的进入者。我们的研究结果表明，通过社交媒体和其他平台的通信可以加剧竞争，然而，在职优势可能会加强，而不是削弱作为一个结果，更多的进入政治市场。
英文摘要：
An increasing number of politicians are relying on cheaper, easier to access technologies such as online social media platforms to communicate with their constituency. These platforms present a cheap and low-barrier channel of communication to politicians, potentially intensifying political competition by allowing many to enter political races. In this study, we demonstrate that lowering costs of communication, which allows many entrants to come into a competitive market, can strengthen an incumbent's position when the newcomers compete by providing more information to the voters. We show an asymmetric bad-news-good-news effect where early negative news hurts the challengers more than the positive news benefit them, such that in aggregate, an incumbent politician's chances of winning is higher with more entrants in the market. Our findings indicate that communication through social media and other platforms can intensify competition, how-ever incumbency advantage may be strengthened rather than weakened as an outcome of higher number of entrants into a political market.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
