分裂与分化
Divide and Diverge: Political Competition and the Organization of Conflict
AI总结:
本文通过概率投票模型分析了选举竞争如何促使政党极化,揭示了平台差异化在稳定政治权力中的作用,并探讨了极化对政治沟通和制度的影响。
摘要:
政治极化可能对竞争政党有益。我研究了选举竞争本身如何产生极化选民的激励,即使政党在事前完全相同,且仅由纯粹的政治权力动机驱动,即被解释为官职租金或影响力。我开发了一个概率投票模型,其中包含总体受欢迎程度冲击,政党从政治权力获得的边际效用递减。均衡政策趋同失败。平台差异化通过确保忠诚的选民基础和稳定政治权力,为对抗选举波动提供保险。在单维政策空间中,当选民在中位两侧变得更加极端时,政党在均衡中的收益上升,包括当极化由对手支持者变化驱动时。在多维设置中,政党从思想一致性和跨议题分歧的协调中获益。这些结果对极化政治沟通、政党身份和选举制度有影响。
英文摘要:
Why do politicians sharpen divisions when elections reward broad appeal? I model how two identical, office-motivated parties turn voter disagreement into partisan conflict. Elections allocate political power. Each party empowers its most valuable members first, so power has diminishing returns. Platforms never converge: differentiation builds constituencies that survive adverse popularity shocks. Voter polarization pushes platforms apart and benefits both parties--even when a voter group grows more hostile to one party. Across issues, parties divide along the direction that generates more voter conflict--for elliptical electorates, a leading principal component of voter positions, consistent with ANES survey evidence.
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