自然灾害的选举后果：一项动态固定效应分析
The Electoral Consequences of Natural Disasters: A Dynamic Fixed-Effects Analysis
AI总结：
本文基于1989—2021年美国市长选举面板数据，运用动态双向固定效应事件研究法，发现灾害时机决定选举影响：同季度灾害使在任者得票率提高逾6个百分点，但灾害平均压低投票率1.4个百分点，并显著提升在任者寻求连任的可能性。
摘要：
随着重大自然灾害日益频繁，理解其政治后果对于民主问责至关重要。现有文献存在深刻分歧：一些研究发现选民会因灾害相关损失而惩罚在任者，而另一些研究则发现选民会因救灾努力而奖励在任者。本文考察了自然灾害对在任市长选举后果、更广泛的选举动态以及官员长期政治抱负的影响。本研究利用一个涵盖1989年至2021年美国市长选举中超过10,000个候选人-选举观测值的综合面板数据集，将详细选举数据与全球灾害事件登记数据相结合。为识别因果效应，分析采用稳健的动态双向固定效应事件研究设计，并通过广泛的趋势前检验和安慰剂检验加以验证。研究发现，灾害的选举影响高度取决于其发生时机。与选举同季度发生的灾害会为在任者带来显著的选举提振，使其得票率提高超过6个百分点。然而，灾害持续抑制选民投票率，使其平均降低1.4个百分点。一项新颖的发现表明，管理灾害的经历会显著提高在任者在后续选举周期中寻求连任的可能性，增幅高达12个百分点。这些发现通过强调选民短视和议题显著性的关键作用，有助于调和相互冲突的回顾性投票理论。它们还揭示了一个此前未被记录的危机塑造政治生涯的渠道，表明灾害管理不仅是对治理能力的考验，也是政治抱负的催化剂。[当前版本为预印本。]
英文摘要：
With the increasing frequency of major natural disasters, understanding their political consequences is of paramount importance for democratic accountability. The existing literature is deeply divided, with some studies finding that voters punish incumbents for disaster-related damages, while others find they reward them for relief efforts. This paper investigates the electoral consequences of natural disasters for incumbent mayors, broader electoral dynamics, and the long-term political ambition of officeholders. The study leverages a comprehensive panel dataset of over 10,000 candidate-election observations in U.S. mayoral races from 1989 to 2021, combining detailed election data with a global registry of disaster events. To identify causal effects, the analysis employs a robust dynamic two-way fixed-effects event-study design, validated by extensive pre-trend and placebo tests. The findings reveal that the electoral impact of disasters is highly conditional on their timing. A disaster that strikes in the same quarter as an election provides a significant electoral boost to incumbents, increasing their vote share by over 6 percentage points. However, disasters consistently suppress voter turnout, reducing it by an average of 1.4 percentage points. In a novel finding, the analysis demonstrates that the experience of managing a disaster significantly increases an incumbent's likelihood of seeking re-election in the subsequent cycle by as much as 12 percentage points. These findings help reconcile conflicting theories of retrospective voting by highlighting the critical role of voter myopia and salience. They also reveal a previously undocumented channel through which crises shape political careers, suggesting that disaster management is not only a test of governance but also a catalyst for political ambition. [The current version is a preprint.]
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