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arXiv 2101.06885econ.TH
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分配机制:共同偏好和信息获取

Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition

Georgy Artemov

摘要:

我在双边匹配问题中研究了昂贵的信息获取,例如将申请人与学校匹配。申请人的效用是一个共同的和特殊的组成部分的总和。申请人不知道特殊成分,但可以付出代价学习。当申请人被分配使用顺序策略证明机制,太少的获取信息,产生重大的福利损失。平权行动和其他现实的政策可能会导致帕累托改进。由于获取信息的激励机制在不同机制之间存在差异,忽略这些激励机制可能会导致不正确的福利评估,例如,在比较流行的立即分配和顺序策略验证机制时。

英文摘要:

I study costly information acquisition in a two-sided matching problem, such as matching applicants to schools. An applicant's utility is a sum of common and idiosyncratic components. The idiosyncratic component is unknown to the applicant but can be learned at a cost. When applicants are assigned using an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism, too few acquire information, generating a significant welfare loss. Affirmative action and other realistic policies may lead to a Pareto improvement. As incentives to acquire information differ across mechanisms, ignoring such incentives may lead to incorrect welfare assessments, for example, in comparing a popular Immediate Assignment and an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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