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arXiv 2511.21147econ.TH
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难民营分配与负担共享

Asylum Assignment and Burden-Sharing

ZEW — Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research(欧洲经济研究中心莱布尼茨研究所);Peking University HSBC Business School(北京大学汇丰商学院)

Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna

AI总结:

本文研究了难民营寻求者与成员国的匹配问题,提出了一种在同质负担下保证稳定性和策略无偏性的机制,但在异质负担情况下可能无法实现稳定性和策略无偏性。

摘要:

我们分析了将难民营寻求者匹配到成员国的问题,纳入等待时间、难民营寻求者的偏好以及成员国的优先级、容量和负担共享承诺。我们识别出一种独特的选择规则,能够在兼顾优先级和容量的同时确保可行性。我们检验了同质和异质难民营寻求者负担大小对匹配过程的影响。我们的主要结果表明,当所有难民营寻求者都被视为具有相同的负担大小时,难民营寻求者提议的累积提供机制能够同时保证稳定性和策略无偏性。相比之下,当负担大小不同时,存在某些场景下实现稳定性和策略无偏性将不再可能。

英文摘要:

We analyze the problem of matching asylum seekers to member states, incorporating wait times, preferences of asylum seekers, and the priorities, capacities, and burden-sharing commitments of member states. We identify a unique choice rule that addresses feasibility while balancing priorities and capacities. We examine the effects of both homogeneous and heterogeneous burden-sizes among asylum seekers on the matching process. Our main result shows that when all asylum seekers are treated as having identical burden-sizes, the asylum-seeker-proposing cumulative offer mechanism guarantees both stability and strategy-proofness. In contrast, when burden-sizes vary, there are scenarios where achieving stability or strategy-proofness is no longer possible.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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