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arXiv 2011.04306econ.TH
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有序偏好强度下的高效分配

Efficient allocation with ordinal preference intensities

University of Glasgow(格拉斯哥大学)

Georgios Gerasimou

AI总结:

本文研究了在有序偏好强度环境中,通过结合替代品排序与偏好改进信息,提出强度高效和强度位置分配标准,以提升帕累托效率。

摘要:

传统有序分配方法忽视了代理人对不同改进的价值强度,而 cardinal 方法需要额外假设,通常被认为过于苛刻。本文研究了中间环境下的分配问题,即*有序偏好强度*,其中代理人可以对替代品进行排序以及偏好改进。本文提出的两个标准--*强度高效*和*强度位置*分配--利用这种综合信息,通过新颖的支配概念和布雷拉式评分的泛化来提升帕累托效率。这些标准指明了新的方向,在不假设卡特尔效用或货币转移的情况下,可能实现更强的福利收益。

英文摘要:

Standard allocation methods that rely on ordinal preferences ignore how strongly agents value different improvements. On the other hand, methods based on cardinal utilities require assumptions that are often considered too demanding. This paper studies the classic one-to-one assignment problem in the middle-ground environment of *ordinal* preference intensities: agents rank alternatives as well as preference improvements, without necessarily being able to quantify these comparisons. The paper introduces an interpersonal comparability assumption for this novel social-choice analytical setting. Building on it, it proposes and analyses the *intensity-efficiency* criterion. This refines Pareto's criterion by discarding any allocation that is worse than another according to an intuitive intensity-dominance relation. The feasibility and applicability of this framework in matching problems is illustrated with two quadratic-time algorithms which, respectively, elicit ordinal intensity rankings and extend the classic Random Priority mechanism in a welfare-improving direction.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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