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arXiv 2401.03598econ.TH
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不可争议的分配

Incontestable Assignments

Université de Namur(南纳穆尔大学);Baruch College(巴鲁克学院)

Benoit Decerf, Guillaume Haeringer, Martin Van der Linden

AI总结:

本文在学生不了解他人偏好与分配的学区匹配环境中定义并刻画不可争议分配,证明其等价于个体理性、非浪费性和尊重最高优先级集合,并分析相关机制的激励性质。

摘要:

在那些分配完全由清算所决定的学区中,学生只有具备正当理由才能对自己的分配提出申诉。若一项分配可免于申诉,则称其为不可争议的。我们研究学生无法观察到其他学生偏好和分配时的不可争议性。不可争议性被证明等价于个体理性、非浪费性以及对最高优先级集合的尊重(这是合理嫉妒的一种弱化)。稳定机制及其帕累托占优机制均不可争议,Top-Trading Cycle(顶级交易循环)机制也是如此(但 Boston 机制不是)。在温和的一致性性质下,不可争议机制是 i-不可区分的(Li, 2017),并具有相似的激励性质。

英文摘要:

We study an information-based weakening of stability for school choice, using the evidence students may invoke in appeals. The model permits partial information about schools' choice functions and the realized assignment. A student has a legitimate complaint if, in every compatible state, she can block with some more-preferred school, and an assignment is incontestable if no student has such a complaint. We characterize legitimate complaints using an ex-post safety-set. For school-side information rules, under which the only admissible assignment-side information is the student's own assignment and all interim-compatible school-side states are preserved, incontestability is equivalent to respecting interim safety-sets. Stable mechanisms and Top Trading Cycles with responsive priorities are incontestable for every such rule. Pareto improvements preserve this robustness. When schools' choice functions are path-independent, all mechanisms that are incontestable for every school-side information rule, are non-wasteful, and guarantee group protection give each student the same attainable set conditional on her preferences and interim information.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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