稳定机制的马基雅维利边界
The Machiavellian frontier of stable mechanisms
AI总结:
本文针对Roth不可能性定理的结论,通过提出严格弱于策略防阻性的$φ$-提升不变性公理,探究稳定机制的边界,最终证明仍无稳定机制满足该公理,强化了原不可能性定理的结论。
摘要:
Roth(1982)提出的不可能性定理指出,不存在同时满足策略防阻性的稳定机制。本文通过弱化策略防阻性的要求,探究稳定机制的马基雅维利边界。对于固定机制$φ$和真实偏好剖面$\boldsymbol{\u227b}$,智能体i的$(φ,\boldsymbol{\u227b})$-提升式谎报是指满足以下两个条件的偏好:(i)提升真实申报下的指派结果$φ_i(\boldsymbol{\u227b})$的排名;(ii)该真实指派结果新位置以上的偏好排名保持不变。我们要求匹配机制$φ$既不惩罚也不奖励这类谎报行为,并将该公理定义为$φ$-提升不变性,这一要求严格弱于策略防阻性。我们证明不存在满足$φ$-提升不变性的稳定机制$φ$,该否定性结论强化了Roth不可能性定理。
英文摘要:
The impossibility theorem in Roth (1982) states that no stable mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness. This paper explores the Machiavellian frontier of stable mechanisms by weakening strategy-proofness. For a fixed mechanism $φ$ and a true preference profile $\succ$, a $(φ,\succ)$-boost mispresentation of agent i is a preference of i that is obtained by (i) raising the ranking of the truth-telling assignment $φ_i(\succ)$, and (ii) keeping rankings unchanged above the new position of this truth-telling assignment. We require a matching mechanism $φ$ neither punish nor reward any such misrepresentation, and define such axiom as $φ$-boost-invariance. This is strictly weaker than requiring strategy-proofness. We show that no stable mechanism $φ$ satisfies $φ$-boost-invariance. Our negative result strengthens the Roth Impossibility Theorem.
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