arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2007.05164cs.GT
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组合购买者贝叶斯收益最大化的(不)-逼近性

On the (in)-approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer

Natalie Collina, S. Matthew Weinberg

摘要:

我们考虑一个收入最大化的单一卖方与$m$项目出售给一个单一的买家,其价值$v(\cdot)$的项目是从一个已知的分布$D$的支持$k$。Cai等人的一系列工作建立了当$D$支持下的每个$v(\cdot)$是加性或单位需求(或$c$ -需求)时,可以在$\operatorname{poly}(m,k)$时间内找到收入最优拍卖。我们表明,仅仅超出这一点,甚至拟阵为基础的估值(一个适当的子集的总替代),结果在强硬度的近似。具体地说,即使在具有$m$项和$k \leq m$赋值的实例上支持$D$,也不可能实现任何$\varepsilon>0$的$1/m^{1-\varepsilon}$ -近似到(随机化)多时间中基于矩阵的赋值的收入最优机制,除非NP $\subseteq$ RP(注意,$1/k$ -近似是微不足道的)。Cai等人的主要技术贡献是从$\mathcal{V}$类中估值的收入最大化到优化$\mathcal{V}$类中两个值之间的差异的黑盒缩减。我们的主要技术贡献是在另一个方向上的黑箱约简(对于广泛的估值类别),确定它们的约简本质上是紧密的。

英文摘要:

We consider a revenue-maximizing single seller with $m$ items for sale to a single buyer whose value $v(\cdot)$ for the items is drawn from a known distribution $D$ of support $k$. A series of works by Cai et al. establishes that when each $v(\cdot)$ in the support of $D$ is additive or unit-demand (or $c$-demand), the revenue-optimal auction can be found in $\operatorname{poly}(m,k)$ time. We show that going barely beyond this, even to matroid-based valuations (a proper subset of Gross Substitutes), results in strong hardness of approximation. Specifically, even on instances with $m$ items and $k \leq m$ valuations in the support of $D$, it is not possible to achieve a $1/m^{1-\varepsilon}$-approximation for any $\varepsilon>0$ to the revenue-optimal mechanism for matroid-based valuations in (randomized) poly-time unless NP $\subseteq$ RP (note that a $1/k$-approximation is trivial). Cai et al.'s main technical contribution is a black-box reduction from revenue maximization for valuations in class $\mathcal{V}$ to optimizing the difference between two values in class $\mathcal{V}$. Our main technical contribution is a black-box reduction in the other direction (for a wide class of valuation classes), establishing that their reduction is essentially tight.

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