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arXiv 1905.01401cs.GTcs.DM
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确定性社会选择规则的改进度量失真

Improved Metric Distortion for Deterministic Social Choice Rules

Kamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang

摘要:

在本文中,我们研究了确定性的社会选择规则,选择一个获胜的候选人从一组候选人的基础上选民的偏好的度量失真。投票者和候选者位于底层度量空间中。选民的成本等于她与获胜候选人的距离。序数社会选择规则只能访问假定与度量距离一致的选民的序数偏好。我们的目标是设计一个有序的社会选择规则与最小的失真,这是最坏情况下的比例,在所有一致的指标,社会成本之间的规则和最佳的全知规则与知识的基础度量空间。已知最佳确定性社会选择规则的失真介于$3$和$5$之间。已经证明,任何只考虑候选者的加权锦标赛图的规则都不可能比$5$具有更好的失真。在本文中,我们通过提出一个带有$4.236$失真的加权竞赛规则来反驳它。我们通过推广未覆盖集的经典概念来设计这一规则,并进一步证明了这类规则不可能比$4.236$更好地具有失真。然后,我们提出了一个新的投票规则,通过另一种推广的未覆盖集。我们表明,如果一个候选人满足这个投票规则的标准存在,那么选择这样的候选人产生的失真界的$3$,匹配的下限。我们提出了一个组合猜想,这意味着失真的$3$,并验证它的少量候选人和选民的计算机实验。使用我们的框架,我们还表明,选择任何候选人保证失真时,最多$3$的加权比赛图是循环对称的。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we study the metric distortion of deterministic social choice rules that choose a winning candidate from a set of candidates based on voter preferences. Voters and candidates are located in an underlying metric space. A voter has cost equal to her distance to the winning candidate. Ordinal social choice rules only have access to the ordinal preferences of the voters that are assumed to be consistent with the metric distances. Our goal is to design an ordinal social choice rule with minimum distortion, which is the worst-case ratio, over all consistent metrics, between the social cost of the rule and that of the optimal omniscient rule with knowledge of the underlying metric space. The distortion of the best deterministic social choice rule was known to be between $3$ and $5$. It had been conjectured that any rule that only looks at the weighted tournament graph on the candidates cannot have distortion better than $5$. In our paper, we disprove it by presenting a weighted tournament rule with distortion of $4.236$. We design this rule by generalizing the classic notion of uncovered sets, and further show that this class of rules cannot have distortion better than $4.236$. We then propose a new voting rule, via an alternative generalization of uncovered sets. We show that if a candidate satisfying the criterion of this voting rule exists, then choosing such a candidate yields a distortion bound of $3$, matching the lower bound. We present a combinatorial conjecture that implies distortion of $3$, and verify it for small numbers of candidates and voters by computer experiments. Using our framework, we also show that selecting any candidate guarantees distortion of at most $3$ when the weighted tournament graph is cyclically symmetric.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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