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arXiv 1706.03058q-bio.PEcond-mat.stat-mechphysics.bio-ph
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进化博弈的热力学

Thermodynamics of Evolutionary Games

Christoph Adami, Arend Hintze

摘要:

参与者之间的合作是如何进化的,这是一个尚未解决的生物学问题。在这里,我们使用哈密尔顿动力学模型的伊辛型来描述人口的合作和背叛的球员,以表明合作者的平衡分数是由一个热观测类似于磁化的期望值。我们应用的形式主义的公共产品的游戏有三个球员,并表明,合作和背叛之间的相变发生,相当于在一维伊辛晶体与长程相互作用的过渡。然后,我们研究了惩罚对合作的影响,发现惩罚起到了磁场的作用,导致玩家之间的“对齐”,从而鼓励合作。我们建议,热哈密顿合作的演变图片可以产生其他见解的动态不断变化的群体通过挖掘低维自旋系统中的临界动力学的丰富文献。

英文摘要:

How cooperation can evolve between players is an unsolved problem of biology. Here we use Hamiltonian dynamics of models of the Ising type to describe populations of cooperating and defecting players to show that the equilibrium fraction of cooperators is given by the expectation value of a thermal observable akin to a magnetization. We apply the formalism to the Public Goods game with three players, and show that a phase transition between cooperation and defection occurs that is equivalent to a transition in one-dimensional Ising crystals with long-range interactions. We then investigate the effect of punishment on cooperation and find that punishment plays the role of a magnetic field that leads to an "alignment" between players, thus encouraging cooperation. We suggest that a thermal Hamiltonian picture of the evolution of cooperation can generate other insights about the dynamics of evolving groups by mining the rich literature of critical dynamics in low-dimensional spin systems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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