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arXiv 0912.0157q-bio.PEcond-mat.stat-mechnlin.AOq-bio.QM
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非消失选择条件下进化博弈中的固定

Fixation in Evolutionary Games under Non-Vanishing Selection

Mauro Mobilia, Michael Assaf

摘要:

在演化博弈论中,波动最显著的影响之一是突变体固定(接管)整个种群的可能性。在这里,我们推广了最近的WKB为基础的理论研究固定在进化游戏下的非零选择,并调查选择强度w和人口(随机)波动之间的关系。这使得大的波动的准确治疗,并产生的概率和平均时间的固定超过弱选择限制。该理论的力量证明了多个吸收状态的合作困境的原型模型。我们的预测比较出色的数值模拟,有限的w,显着提高了福克-普朗克近似。

英文摘要:

One of the most striking effect of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory is the possibility for mutants to fixate (take over) an entire population. Here, we generalize a recent WKB-based theory to study fixation in evolutionary games under non-vanishing selection, and investigate the relation between selection intensity w and demographic (random) fluctuations. This allows the accurate treatment of large fluctuations and yields the probability and mean times of fixation beyond the weak selection limit. The power of the theory is demonstrated on prototypical models of cooperation dilemmas with multiple absorbing states. Our predictions compare excellently with numerical simulations and, for finite w, significantly improve over those of the Fokker-Planck approximation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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