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arXiv 0812.0851q-bio.PE
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弱选择条件下进化博弈中的固定时间

Fixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection

Philipp M. Altrock, Arne Traulsen

摘要:

在进化博弈动力学中,繁殖成功率随着进化博弈中的表现而增加。如果策略$A$的表现优于策略$B$,则策略$A$将在人群中传播。在随机动力学下,单个突变体迟早会接管整个种群或灭绝。我们分析了与此过程相关的平均退出时间(或平均固定时间)。我们分析表明,这些时间依赖于一个令人惊讶的简单的方式下弱选择,即强随机性的游戏的回报矩阵:回报差$Δπ$是一个线性函数的$A$个人$i$,$Δπ= u i + v$的数量。无条件平均退出时间仅取决于常数项$v$。假设单个$A$突变体接管群体,则相应的条件平均退出时间仅取决于密度依赖项$u$。我们证明了这一发现的两个常用的微观进化过程。

英文摘要:

In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy $A$ performs better than strategy $B$, strategy $A$ will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single mutant will sooner or later take over the entire population or go extinct. We analyze the mean exit times (or average fixation times) associated with this process. We show analytically that these times depend on the payoff matrix of the game in an amazingly simple way under weak selection, ie strong stochasticity: The payoff difference $Δπ$ is a linear function of the number of $A$ individuals $i$, $Δπ= u i + v$. The unconditional mean exit time depends only on the constant term $v$. Given that a single $A$ mutant takes over the population, the corresponding conditional mean exit time depends only on the density dependent term $u$. We demonstrate this finding for two commonly applied microscopic evolutionary processes.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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