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arXiv 0806.2636q-bio.PE
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表型空间中的进化博弈动力学

Evolutionary game dynamics in phenotype space

Tibor Antal, Hisashi Ohtsuki, John Wakeley, Peter D. Taylor, Martin A. Nowak

摘要:

演化动力学可以在混合良好或结构化的种群中进行研究。人口结构通常是由个体在物理空间或社交网络上的异质分布引起的。在这里,我们引入了一种新的空间类型的进化博弈动力学:表型空间。在这个意义上,群体是很好的混合,每个人都有可能与其他人互动,但行为策略取决于表型空间的距离。个人可能会对那些看起来相似或不相似的人表现出不同的行为。个体突变成附近的表型。我们研究人口的“表型太空行走”。我们提出的分析计算,汇集了聚结理论和进化博弈动力学的想法。作为一个特殊的例子,我们调查的合作表型空间的演变。我们得到了自然选择有利于合作者而不是背叛者的精确条件:对于一维表型空间和大种群规模,临界收益成本比由b/c=1+2/sqrt{3}给出。我们推导出任何进化博弈的基本条件,并探索更高维的表型空间。

英文摘要:

Evolutionary dynamics can be studied in well-mixed or structured populations. Population structure typically arises from the heterogeneous distribution of individuals in physical space or on social networks. Here we introduce a new type of space to evolutionary game dynamics: phenotype space. The population is well-mixed in the sense that everyone is equally likely to interact with everyone else, but the behavioral strategies depend on distance in phenotype space. Individuals might behave differently towards those who look similar or dissimilar. Individuals mutate to nearby phenotypes. We study the `phenotypic space walk' of populations. We present analytic calculations that bring together ideas from coalescence theory and evolutionary game dynamics. As a particular example, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in phenotype space. We obtain a precise condition for natural selection to favor cooperators over defectors: for a one-dimensional phenotype space and large population size the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is given by b/c=1+2/sqrt{3}. We derive the fundamental condition for any evolutionary game and explore higher dimensional phenotype spaces.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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