随机进化博弈中多态性的出现
Emergence of polymorphism in stochastic evolutionary games
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中文总结 AI 辅助
研究随机进化博弈中多态性的出现问题，通过对鹰鸽博弈进行时间尺度分离的理论分析方法，刻画随机效应驱动的多态性，发现特定条件下存在持久多态状态，解决了相关理论与模拟结果的差异。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
确定性进化博弈理论未区分所有个体共享混合进化稳定策略的单态群体和以平均再现混合策略的比例存在的纯策略玩家的多态群体。颤抖手假说认为在有限群体中人口统计学噪声选择单态性，但模拟研究在某些情况下发现了矛盾结果。本文通过对典型鹰鸽博弈进行时间尺度分离的理论分析解决了这一差异，刻画了由随机效应驱动的多态性出现，发现在某些条件下存在持久的多态状态。
英文摘要
Deterministic evolutionary game theory makes no distinction between a monomorphic population of individuals all of whom share a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy and a polymorphic population of players of pure strategies present in a ratio that reproduces the mixed strategy on average. The so-called trembling hand hypothesis posits that in finite populations demographic noise selects for monomorphism, however, simulation studies have found contradictory results in some situations. Here we resolve this discrepancy by conducting a theoretical analysis of the paradigmatic Hawk-Dove game using timescale separation. We characterise the emergence of polymorphism driven by stochastic effects, finding long-lasting polymorphic states in certain conditions.
