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arXiv 1210.2806math.OCcs.GTcs.SYeess.SY
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风险敏感平均场博弈

Risk-Sensitive Mean Field Games

Ecole Supérieure d’Electricité (SUPELEC)(国立高等电力学院);University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign(伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校)

Hamidou Tembine, Quanyan Zhu, Tamer Basar

AI总结:

研究一类风险敏感平均场随机微分博弈,证明在适当正则条件下,带指数积分代价泛函的随机微分博弈的平均场值与带有附加二次项的HJB方程描述的值函数一致,并给出对数二次代价和仿射状态动力学下的显式解,通过数值例子说明线性和McKean-Vlasov动力学行为。

摘要:

本文研究了一类风险敏感平均场随机微分博弈。我们证明,在适当的正则条件下,具有指数积分代价泛函的随机微分博弈的平均场值与由带有附加二次项的Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)方程描述的值函数一致。当瞬时代价函数为对数二次且状态动力学关于控制仿射时,我们给出了平均场最优响应的显式解。提出了一个等价的平均场风险中性问题,并利用前向-后向宏观McKean-Vlasov方程、Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov方程和HJB方程刻画了相应的平均场均衡。我们提供了关于平均场行为的数值例子,以说明线性和McKean-Vlasov动力学。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we study a class of risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential games. We show that under appropriate regularity conditions, the mean-field value of the stochastic differential game with exponentiated integral cost functional coincides with the value function described by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with an additional quadratic term. We provide an explicit solution of the mean-field best response when the instantaneous cost functions are log-quadratic and the state dynamics are affine in the control. An equivalent mean-field risk-neutral problem is formulated and the corresponding mean-field equilibria are characterized in terms of backward-forward macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equations, Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equations, and HJB equations. We provide numerical examples on the mean field behavior to illustrate both linear and McKean-Vlasov dynamics.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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