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arXiv 2005.02232math.OC

Discrete-time mean field games with risk averse-agents

J. Frédéric Bonnans, Pierre Lavigne, Laurent Pfeiffer

英文摘要:

We propose and investigate a discrete-time mean field game model involving risk-averse agents. The model under study is a coupled system of dynamic programming equations with a Kolmogorov equation. The agents' risk aversion is modeled by composite risk measures. The existence of a solution to the coupled system is obtained with a fixed point approach. The corresponding feedback control allows to construct an approximate Nash equilibrium for a related dynamic game with finitely many players.

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