This paper presents a dynamic game framework to analyze the role of large banks in interbank markets. By extending existing models, we incorporate a large bank as a dynamic decision-maker interacting with multiple small banks. Using the mean-field game methodology and convex analysis, best-response trading strategies are derived, leading to an approximate equilibrium for the interbank market. We investigate the influence of the large bank on the market stability by examining individual default probabilities and systemic risk, through the use of Monte Carlo simulations. Our findings reveal that, when the size of the major bank is not excessively large, it can positively contribute to market stability. However, there is also the potential for negative spillover effects in the event of default, leading to an increase in systemic risk. The magnitude of this impact is further influenced by the size and trading rate of the major bank. Overall, this study provides valuable insights into the management of systemic risk in interbank markets.
Systemic Risk Models for Disjoint and Overlapping Groups with Equilibrium Strategies
我们分析了不相交和重叠组的系统性风险(例如,中央结算对手方(CCP))提出了新的模型与现实的游戏功能。具体地说,我们推广了[F. Biagini,J. P. Fouque,M. Frittelli和T. Meyer-Brandis,Finance and Stochastics,24(2020),513- 564]通过允许单个银行选择他们喜欢的组,而不是被分配到某些组。我们对这些新模型引入了纳什均衡的概念,并分析了风险因子服从高斯分布时的最优解。我们还给出了单个银行风险分配的显式解,并从理论和数值上研究了纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性。所开发的数值算法可以模拟的情况下,均衡,我们应用它来研究银行CCP结构与实际数据,并显示所提出的模型的有效性。
Latent Fragility and Clustered Withdrawals in Dynamic Banks Runs
University of Rome Tor Vergata(罗马托尔维加塔大学);Bielefeld University(比勒费尔德大学);Kenan-Flagler Business School, UNC Chapel Hill(北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校凯南-弗拉格勒商学院);Questrom School of Business, Boston University(波士顿大学奎斯特罗姆商学院)