arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2305.17830q-fin.MFcs.SYeess.SYmath.OCmath.PR
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大型银行与系统性风险:基于平均场博弈模型的洞见

Large Banks and Systemic Risk: Insights from a Mean-Field Game Model

Yuanyuan Chang, Dena Firoozi, David Benatia

AI总结:

本文构建动态博弈框架,纳入大型银行与小型银行互动,通过平均场博弈和凸分析推导最优策略,结合蒙特卡洛模拟揭示大型银行规模对市场稳定性的双重影响,为系统性风险管理提供洞见。

摘要:

本文提出一个动态博弈框架,分析大型银行在银行间市场中的作用。通过扩展现有模型,我们将大型银行纳入为与多家小型银行互动的动态决策者。利用平均场博弈方法和凸分析,推导最优响应交易策略,得出银行间市场的近似均衡。我们通过蒙特卡洛模拟,考察个体违约概率和系统性风险,研究大型银行对市场稳定性的影响。研究发现,当大型银行规模不过于庞大时,可对市场稳定性产生积极贡献;但违约时可能产生负溢出效应,导致系统性风险上升,其影响程度还受大型银行规模和交易率的影响。本研究为银行间市场系统性风险管理提供了宝贵洞见。

英文摘要:

This paper presents a dynamic game framework to analyze the role of large banks in interbank markets. By extending existing models, we incorporate a large bank as a dynamic decision-maker interacting with multiple small banks. Using the mean-field game methodology and convex analysis, best-response trading strategies are derived, leading to an approximate equilibrium for the interbank market. We investigate the influence of the large bank on the market stability by examining individual default probabilities and systemic risk, through the use of Monte Carlo simulations. Our findings reveal that, when the size of the major bank is not excessively large, it can positively contribute to market stability. However, there is also the potential for negative spillover effects in the event of default, leading to an increase in systemic risk. The magnitude of this impact is further influenced by the size and trading rate of the major bank. Overall, this study provides valuable insights into the management of systemic risk in interbank markets.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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