饱和网络中的均衡与系统风险
Equilibria and Systemic Risk in Saturated Networks
摘要:
我们进行了一个基本的研究网络平衡建模为解决方案的单调线性函数饱和非线性的不动点方程。所考虑的模型扩展了最初提出的一个研究系统性风险的金融机构网络相互联系的义务,是一个最简单的连续模型占冲击传播现象和级联故障的影响。并刻画了具有策略互补性的约束二次网络博弈的纳什均衡。我们首先推导出网络平衡点的显式表达式,并证明了其唯一性的充要条件,包括和推广文献中的结果。然后,我们研究了网络平衡点的跳跃不连续性时,外源流量通过某些区域的测度0表示为连续函数的图形。最后,我们讨论了我们的研究结果在两个主要的激励应用的一些影响。在金融网络中,这种分叉现象是少数节点资产的小冲击如何引发系统的重大总损失并导致多个代理人违约的原因。在约束二次网络博弈中,它导致纳什均衡关于个体收益的灵敏度的爆破行为。
英文摘要:
We undertake a fundamental study of network equilibria modeled as solutions of fixed point equations for monotone linear functions with saturation nonlinearities. The considered model extends one originally proposed to study systemic risk in networks of financial institutions interconnected by mutual obligations and is one of the simplest continuous models accounting for shock propagation phenomena and cascading failure effects. It also characterizes Nash equilibria of constrained quadratic network games with strategic complementarities. We first derive explicit expressions for network equilibria and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for their uniqueness encompassing and generalizing results available in the literature. Then, we study jump discontinuities of the network equilibria when the exogenous flows cross certain regions of measure 0 representable as graphs of continuous functions. Finally, we discuss some implications of our results in the two main motivating applications. In financial networks, this bifurcation phenomenon is responsible for how small shocks in the assets of a few nodes can trigger major aggregate losses to the system and cause the default of several agents. In constrained quadratic network games, it induces a blow-up behavior of the sensitivity of Nash equilibria with respect to the individual benefits.
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