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arXiv 1607.06373q-fin.MF
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系统性风险与时滞随机博弈

Systemic Risk and Stochastic Games with Delay

Rene Carmona, Jean-Pierre Fouque, Seyyed Mostafa Mousavi, Li-Hsien Sun

摘要:

我们提出了一个考虑清算债务义务的银行间借贷模型。$N$银行的对数货币储备的演变是由控制驱动的耦合扩散描述的,其漂移具有延迟。银行正在最小化其有限期限目标函数,该目标函数考虑了借贷的二次成本以及在准备金相对于系统平均资本化较低时借贷或在准备金相对于系统平均资本化较高时借贷的线性激励。因此,我们的问题是一个$N$ -局中人线性二次随机微分对策的延迟。一个开环纳什均衡是使用一个系统的完全耦合的前向和先进的倒向随机微分方程。然后,我们描述了延迟如何影响流动性和以大量违约为特征的系统性风险。我们还得到了一个闭环纳什均衡使用HJB方法。

英文摘要:

We propose a model of inter-bank lending and borrowing which takes into account clearing debt obligations. The evolution of log-monetary reserves of $N$ banks is described by coupled diffusions driven by controls with delay in their drifts. Banks are minimizing their finite-horizon objective functions which take into account a quadratic cost for lending or borrowing and a linear incentive to borrow if the reserve is low or lend if the reserve is high relative to the average capitalization of the system. As such, our problem is an $N$-player linear-quadratic stochastic differential game with delay. An open-loop Nash equilibrium is obtained using a system of fully coupled forward and advanced backward stochastic differential equations. We then describe how the delay affects liquidity and systemic risk characterized by a large number of defaults. We also derive a close-loop Nash equilibrium using an HJB approach.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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