系统性风险下的贱卖与借贷优化
Optimization of Fire Sales and Borrowing in Systemic Risk
摘要：
本文提供了一个框架，在网络中的火灾销售和价格的影响，但允许企业借款，以弥补他们的短缺，以及金融传染建模。我们考虑无抵押贷款和抵押贷款。本文的主要结果是给出了清算解的存在唯一性的充分条件（即，支付、清算和借款）;在这样的设置中，任何清算解决方案都是聚合博弈的纳什均衡。
英文摘要：
This paper provides a framework for modeling financial contagion in a network subject to fire sales and price impacts, but allowing for firms to borrow to cover their shortfall as well. We consider both uncollateralized and collateralized loans. The main results of this work are providing sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the clearing solutions (i.e., payments, liquidations, and borrowing); in such a setting any clearing solution is the Nash equilibrium of an aggregation game.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
