具有Lp范数漂移的风险敏感均场型游戏
Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field-Type Games with Lp-norm Drifts
AI总结:
本文研究风险敏感玩家在状态-动作分布共同影响结果时的行为,提出均场型游戏新框架,建立具有p-范数漂移结构的有限维随机最大原理,并通过动态规划原理在无限维中推导充分最优性方程。
摘要:
我们研究了在结果不仅受状态-动作配置影响,还受其分布影响的情况下,风险敏感玩家的行为。在这样的交互决策问题中,经典均场游戏框架不适用。我们偏离大部分均场游戏文献,假设决策者可能将其自身状态分布纳入决策中,从而引出均场型游戏类别。在均场型情境中,单个决策者可能对均场项产生重大影响,从而推导出新的最优性方程。我们建立了具有p-范数结构漂移函数的均场型游戏的有限维随机最大原理,该结构弱化了经典Lipschitz和可微性假设。通过动态规划原理在无限维中建立充分最优性方程。利用de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage定理,我们证明了非线性 McKean-Vlasov 动力学的粒子传播混沌性质。
英文摘要:
We study how risk-sensitive players act in situations where the outcome is influenced not only by the state-action profile but also by the distribution of it. In such interactive decision-making problems, the classical mean-field game framework does not apply. We depart from most of the mean-field games literature by presuming that a decision-maker may include its own-state distribution in its decision. This leads to the class of mean-field-type games. In mean-field-type situations, a single decision-maker may have a big impact on the mean-field terms for which new type of optimality equations are derived. We establish a finite dimensional stochastic maximum principle for mean-field-type games where the drift functions have a p-norm structure which weaken the classical Lipschitz and differentiability assumptions. Sufficient optimality equations are established via Dynamic Programming Principle but in infinite dimension. Using de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage theorem, we show that a propagation of chaos property with 'virtual' particles holds for the non-linear McKean-Vlasov dynamics.
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