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arXiv 1205.6791cs.GTcs.ITmath.ITmath.OCmath.PR
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不完全信息大集合重复博弈

Repeated games of incomplete information with large sets of states

Fedor Sandomirskiy

摘要:

著名的R.Aumann和M.Maschler定理指出,当状态集K是有限的时,一个N阶段的零和对策G_N在一侧具有不完全信息时,当N趋于无穷大时,其值序列收敛,并且误差项有界于一个常数除以N的平方根。本文讨论了K为无穷大的情形。结果表明,对于具有重尾的可数支撑先验分布p,误差项可以任意缓慢地减小。对于给定的p,下降的最慢可能速度是根据类熵泛函族确定的。我们的方法是基于著名的测度值鞅的最大变差的行为和不完全信息重复博弈的渐近性质之间的联系。

英文摘要:

The famous theorem of R.Aumann and M.Maschler states that the sequence of values of an N-stage zero-sum game G_N with incomplete information on one side converges as N tends to infinity, and the error term is bounded by a constant divided by square root of N if the set of states K is finite. The paper deals with the case of infinite K. It turns out that for countably-supported prior distribution p with heavy tails the error term can decrease arbitrarily slowly. The slowest possible speed of the decreasing for a given p is determined in terms of entropy-like family of functionals. Our approach is based on the well-known connection between the behavior of the maximal variation of measure-valued martingales and asymptotic properties of repeated games with incomplete information.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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