干预下的重复博弈：理论及在通信中的应用
Repeated Games With Intervention: Theory and Applications in Communications
摘要：
在用户共享公共资源的通信系统中，用户的自私行为通常导致次优的资源利用率。已经有大量的工作，模型与自私的用户作为一次性游戏的通信系统，并提出激励计划，以实现帕累托最优的行动配置文件作为非合作的均衡。然而，在许多通信系统中，由于用户之间的强负外部性，一次性博弈的可行支付集是非凸的。因此，有可能通过让用户选择不同收益的凸组合来扩展可行收益的集合。在本文中，我们提出了一个重复博弈模型的干预广义。首先，我们使用重复的游戏，凸的一次游戏中的可行的支付。其次，我们结合传统的重复游戏与干预，最初提出的一次性游戏，以实现更大的一组均衡收益和放松的要求，用户的耐心，以实现it.We研究的问题，最大化的福利函数定义的用户的均衡收益，受最低收益保证。在给定最优均衡收益的情况下，我们推导出了最小干预能力，并设计了相应的均衡策略。所提出的广义重复博弈模型适用于各种通信系统，如功率控制和流量控制。
英文摘要：
In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games and propose incentive schemes to achieve Pareto optimal action profiles as non-cooperative equilibria. However, in many communication systems, due to strong negative externalities among users, the sets of feasible payoffs in one-shot games are nonconvex. Thus, it is possible to expand the set of feasible payoffs by having users choose convex combinations of different payoffs. In this paper, we propose a repeated game model generalized by intervention. First, we use repeated games to convexify the set of feasible payoffs in one-shot games. Second, we combine conventional repeated games with intervention, originally proposed for one-shot games, to achieve a larger set of equilibrium payoffs and loosen requirements for users' patience to achieve it. We study the problem of maximizing a welfare function defined on users' equilibrium payoffs, subject to minimum payoff guarantees. Given the optimal equilibrium payoff, we derive the minimum intervention capability required and design corresponding equilibrium strategies. The proposed generalized repeated game model applies to various communication systems, such as power control and flow control.
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