干预自私用户的权力控制游戏
Intervention in Power Control Games With Selfish Users
摘要:
研究了具有自私用户的无线自组织网络中的功率控制问题。在没有激励机制的情况下,自私用户倾向于以其最大功率电平进行传输,从而对彼此造成显著干扰。在本文中,我们研究了一类基于干预的激励机制,以诱导自私的用户发送在期望的功率水平。干预方案可以通过引入干预设备来实现,该干预设备可以监视用户的功率电平,然后发送功率以对用户造成干扰。我们主要考虑基于个人发射功率的一阶干预规则。我们推导出设计参数和干预能力的条件,以实现所需的结果作为(唯一的)纳什均衡,并提出了一个动态的调整过程,设计师可以用来指导用户和干预设备所需的结果。最后分析了基于总接收功率的干预规则的效果。我们的研究结果表明,与完美的监测干预方案可以被设计为实现任何积极的功率分布,而使用的干扰干预设备只作为一种威胁。我们还分析了不完善的监控的情况下,性能损失可能会发生。最后,通过仿真实验说明了使用干预规则后系统性能的改善,并比较了不同干预规则的性能。
英文摘要:
We study the power control problem in wireless ad hoc networks with selfish users. Without incentive schemes, selfish users tend to transmit at their maximum power levels, causing significant interference to each other. In this paper, we study a class of incentive schemes based on intervention to induce selfish users to transmit at desired power levels. An intervention scheme can be implemented by introducing an intervention device that can monitor the power levels of users and then transmit power to cause interference to users. We mainly consider first-order intervention rules based on individual transmit powers. We derive conditions on design parameters and the intervention capability to achieve a desired outcome as a (unique) Nash equilibrium and propose a dynamic adjustment process that the designer can use to guide users and the intervention device to the desired outcome. The effect of using intervention rules based on aggregate receive power is also analyzed. Our results show that with perfect monitoring intervention schemes can be designed to achieve any positive power profile while using interference from the intervention device only as a threat. We also analyze the case of imperfect monitoring and show that a performance loss can occur. Lastly, simulation results are presented to illustrate the performance improvement from using intervention rules and compare the performances of different intervention rules.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。