基于合作传输的联盟博弈：自私分组转发无线网络中边界节点诅咒的治疗
Coalition Games with Cooperative Transmission: A Cure for the Curse of Boundary Nodes in Selfish Packet-Forwarding Wireless Networks
摘要：
在具有自私节点的无线分组转发网络中，重复博弈的应用可以诱导节点之间相互转发数据包，从而提高网络性能。然而，这种网络边界上的节点不能从这种策略中受益，因为其他节点不依赖于它们。这个问题有时被称为边界节点的诅咒。为了克服这个问题，提出了一种基于联盟博弈的方法，在该方法中，边界节点可以使用合作传输来帮助网络中间的骨干节点。作为回报，骨干节点愿意转发边界节点的分组。联盟的稳定性进行了研究，使用的概念的核心。然后研究了基于核仁的最小-最大公平性和基于Shapley函数的平均公平性。最后，一个协议的设计，使用重复游戏和联盟游戏。仿真结果显示了边界节点和骨干节点如何根据不同的公平性准则形成联盟。与纯重复博弈方案相比，该协议可使网络连通性提高约50%。
英文摘要：
In wireless packet-forwarding networks with selfish nodes, applications of a repeated game can induce the nodes to forward each others' packets, so that the network performance can be improved. However, the nodes on the boundary of such networks cannot benefit from this strategy, as the other nodes do not depend on them. This problem is sometimes known as the curse of the boundary nodes. To overcome this problem, an approach based on coalition games is proposed, in which the boundary nodes can use cooperative transmission to help the backbone nodes in the middle of the network. In return, the backbone nodes are willing to forward the boundary nodes' packets. The stability of the coalitions is studied using the concept of a core. Then two types of fairness, namely, the min-max fairness using nucleolus and the average fairness using the Shapley function are investigated. Finally, a protocol is designed using both repeated games and coalition games. Simulation results show how boundary nodes and backbone nodes form coalitions together according to different fairness criteria. The proposed protocol can improve the network connectivity by about 50%, compared with pure repeated game schemes.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
