衰落信道中有捕获的随机接入博弈：均衡与Braess类博弈
Random Access Game in Fading Channels with Capture: Equilibria and Braess-like Paradoxes
摘要：
分析了具有自私节点的时隙ALOHA系统中传输概率的纳什均衡点。该系统由有限数量的异构节点组成，每个节点都试图自私地最小化其平均传输概率（或功率投资），同时满足其在共享无线信道上到公共基站（BS）的平均吞吐量需求。我们使用博弈论的方法来分析两种接收模式下的网络：一个是所谓的功率捕获，另一个是所谓的信号干扰加噪声比（SINR）捕获。它表明，在某些情况下，Braess类悖论可能会发生。也就是说，当信道状态信息（CSI）在自私节点处可用时，系统的性能可能变得更差而不是更好。特别是，对于同质节点，我们分析提出，Braess的悖论发生在功率捕获模型，并在SINR捕获模型的捕获比大于1和噪声信号比足够小。
英文摘要：
The Nash equilibrium point of the transmission probabilities in a slotted ALOHA system with selfish nodes is analyzed. The system consists of a finite number of heterogeneous nodes, each trying to minimize its average transmission probability (or power investment) selfishly while meeting its average throughput demand over the shared wireless channel to a common base station (BS). We use a game-theoretic approach to analyze the network under two reception models: one is called power capture, the other is called signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) capture. It is shown that, in some situations, Braess-like paradoxes may occur. That is, the performance of the system may become worse instead of better when channel state information (CSI) is available at the selfish nodes. In particular, for homogeneous nodes, we analytically present that Braess-like paradoxes occur in the power capture model, and in the SINR capture model with the capture ratio larger than one and the noise to signal ratio sufficiently small.
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