信号的结构：不完全信息博弈的因果相关模型
The Structure of Signals: Causal Interdependence Models for Games of Incomplete Information
摘要：
传统的经济模型通常将私人信息或信号视为从某种潜在状态产生的。最近的工作已经阐明了替代模型，其中信号对应于对现有信息的解释。我们发现，这些配方之间的差异可以急剧铸造的因果关系的依赖结构，并采用图形模型来说明的区别特征。图形表示支持在解释的框架中的信号模式的推断，并建议如何基于生成的模型的结果可以扩展到更一般的情况。在经典的拍卖机制投标博弈的具体见解来自定性图形模型。
英文摘要：
Traditional economic models typically treat private information, or signals, as generated from some underlying state. Recent work has explicated alternative models, where signals correspond to interpretations of available information. We show that the difference between these formulations can be sharply cast in terms of causal dependence structure, and employ graphical models to illustrate the distinguishing characteristics. The graphical representation supports inferences about signal patterns in the interpreted framework, and suggests how results based on the generated model can be extended to more general situations. Specific insights about bidding games in classical auction mechanisms derive from qualitative graphical models.
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